TICKETS PLEASE: MATERIAL BREACH ELEMENTS
AND NO INTENT TO WAIVE - A CASE SYNOPSIS
OF KNIGHT V. HORSE CREEK ROCK INC.
The Court of Appeals of Tennessee at Jackson held that a
failure to comport with the standards of good faith and fair dealing,
to confer the benefit that they reasonably expected, and to
compensate a party, adequately, for the benefit denied may result in
a material breach of a contract, and wavier will not apply if the
parties’ actions do not show intent to waive. Knight v. Horse Creek Rock
Inc., No. W2018-01014-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 1373720 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Mar. 26, 2019).
William Gass
In Knight v. Horse Creek Rock Inc., the Tennessee Court of Appeals
addressed whether a company committed a material breach of a contract
by failing to comport with the standards of good faith and fair dealing,
failing to confer the benefit that they reasonably expected, and failing to
compensate a party for a benefit denied. According to M & M Elec.
Contractor, Inc. v. Cumberland Elec. Membership Corp., “[a] contractual breach
must be material in order to justify relieving the non-breaching party of
their obligations under the contract.” Horse Creek Rock, 2019 WL 1373720,
at *3 (citing M & M Elec. Contractor, Inc. v. Cumberland Elec. Membership Corp.,
529 S.W.3d 413, 423 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016)). Upon review, the Tennessee
Court of Appeals held that a material breach may occur when the full
benefit of the contract is not received, the benefit lost is not easily
verifiable for determining compensation, and the actions of the defendant
did not comport with good faith and fair dealing.
The Court of Appeals addressed whether the breach was invalidated due
to an alleged waiver of a contractual obligation. Waiver may be proven by
the declaration of a party or by acts showing that it was the party’s
intention to waive. Id. at *4 (citing Jenkins Subway Inc. v. Jones, 990 S.W.2d
713, 722 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998)). After review, the Court of Appeals held
that the rights of the plaintiff were not waived as their actions did not
indicate intent to waive.
The court also addressed whether the actions of the plaintiff arose to
intentional interference with a business relationship. Intentional
interference with a business relationship exists when the following
elements can be proved:
(1) an existing business relationship with specific third parties or a
prospective relationship with an identifiable class of third persons; (2) the
defendant's knowledge of that relationship and not a mere awareness of
the plaintiff's business dealings with others in general; (3) the defendant's
intent to cause the breach or termination of the business relationship; (4)
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the defendant's improper motive or improper means; and finally, (5)
damages resulting from the tortious interference.
Id. at *5 (quoting Trau-Med of America, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 71 S.W.3d
691, 701 (Tenn. 2002)). After review, the Court of Appeals held that the
intentional interference with a business relationship did not exist as the
defendant could not identify the parties involved.
In April of 2012, Elton Johnson (“Johnson”) entered into an
agreement with Horse Creek Rock, Inc. (“HCR”) to mine limestone on
his property in Savannah, Tennessee. The lease stated that Johnson would
be provided with copies of the weight tickets, a record of the amount of
limestone quarried from the property and sold to buyers, to determine
HCR’s royalty payments. HCR paid royalties each month that limestone
was mined.
On December 11, 2014, Johnson died, and Susan Knight (“Knight”) was
appointed executrix of the estate. On January 10, 2015, Knight asked
HCR for an account in writing, but HCR failed to provide the weight
tickets required by the contract. On April 2, 2015, Knight filed a
complaint for an accounting of the business practices and notified HCR
of a breach of the contract on May 6, 2015. The lease allowed HCR thirty
days to provide the weight tickets, or the estate could terminate the lease.
On January 14, 2016, Knight notified HCR that the estate terminated the
lease and asked HCR to vacate the leased premises. HCR did not leave
the property and continued to mine limestone. On March 1, 2016, Knight
amended the complaint to include a breach of contract and sought a
declaratory judgment stating that the estate’s option to terminate the lease
was properly executed and the lease was terminated. HCR answered the
complaint, denying the breach, by stating that the weight tickets, though
never given to Johnson, were available upon request. HCR also asserted
counterclaims for intentional interference with a business relationship and
other claims, but the other claims were ultimately dismissed. HCR never
identified the parties that were impacted by the interference. The estate
filed for a motion for summary judgment on the declaratory judgment,
and the trial court granted the motion and declared the lease agreement
terminated on September 6, 2016.
After summary judgment, the estate sought a restraining order and
temporary injunction to stop HCR from mining. On September 19, 2016,
the court set a hearing and issued a restraining order. HCR’s motions were
denied, and the restraining order was granted on November 4, 2016. On
May 1, 2018, the trial court entered an amended order granting the claim
for declaratory judgment which HCR appealed on June 4, 2018. Knight
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filed a motion for summary judgment regarding the claim of intentional
interference with a business relationship on June 8, 2018, which was
granted, but HCR appealed.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals combined HCR’s two appeals and noted
three issues were presented in the case. First, whether the trial court erred
in ruling the breach of contract was material. Second, whether the trial
court erred in determining that the estate did not waive the right to receive
the weight tickets. Third, whether the trial court erred in granting the
estate’s motion for summary judgment regarding the claim for intentional
interference with a business relationship.
HCR argued that while it may have been in technical breach of the
contract, the breach was not material. For the nonbreaching party to be
relieved of its obligations, the breach must be material. Id. at *3 (citing M
& M Elec. Contractor, Inc., 529 S.W.3d at 423). A breach is material when
the following factors are considered:
(a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit
which he reasonably expected;
(b) the extent to which the injured party can be adequately compensated
for the part of that benefit of which he will be deprived;
(c) the extent to which the party failing to perform or to offer to perform
will suffer forfeiture;
(d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to perform
will cure his failure, taking account of all the circumstances including any
reasonable assurances;
(e) the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform or to
offer to perform comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing.
Id. (quoting M & M Elec. Contractor, Inc.,529 S.W.3d at 423).
The Court of Appeals noted that the factors presented in (a), (b),
and (e) were relevant to the case at hand. The purpose of the weighted
tickets was to determine the royalty payments, and the tickets provided
the best way to determine the amount to be paid to Johnson. Without the
tickets, Johnson would not be able to determine, for the purpose of
calculating the royalty payment, if there is a discrepancy between the weigh
summaries and the totaled tickets, and he would not have received the
benefit of knowing the accurate totals. Johnson would not have been able
to determine the extent of the damage and could not determine adequate
compensation. Lastly, HCR was unwilling to correct the error nor provide
the tickets, and HCR failed to give a reason to not provide the tickets.
Failing to give a reason, the court determined HCR did not behave in a
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way that comports with the standard of good faith and fair dealing. The
court determined that the breach was material. The ruling makes clear
that materiality will be considered with the five factors in mind, and the
reasons for the actions of the parties will be analyzed.
HCR next argued that Johnson waived the right to enforce the
weight ticket provision by accepting the summaries without objections. A
party claiming waiver must prove that the other party has waived their
rights. Id. at *4 (Guesthouse Int'l, LLC v. Shoney's N. Am. Corp., 330 S.W.3d
166, 202 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010)). Waiver may be proven by the declaration
of a party or by acts showing intent to not claim an advantage or by failing
to act, which show that it was the party’s intention to waive. Id. (citing
Jenkins Subway, 990 S.W.2d at 722). The court noted that inaction alone
does not prove waiver, and the party seeking to enforce waiver is typically
adversely affected. Id. at n.2 (citing White v. Empire Express, Inc., 395
S.W.3d 696, 716–17 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012). The court also noted that the
goal of waiver was not to entrap parties into thinking that a contractual
duty is not required then suing. Id. at *4 (quoting Guesthouse Int'l, LLC,
330 S.W.3d at 202).
HCR told Johnson weight tickets were available upon request.
However, HCR never sent the copies of the weight tickets to Johnson.
The court determined Johnson’s acceptance of the summary does not
show intent to waive the ticket requirement since Johnson had the ability
to request the tickets at any time. The court determined the right to
enforce the weight ticket was not waived. This ruling indicates that
inactivity with an option to exercise will not waive a right.
HCR argued that the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment for the intentional interference with a business relationship.
Intentional interference with a business relationship can be established by
indicating the specific business relationship or prospective relationship
that is impacted. The party interfering must know of the relationship and
intend to cause harm to the business relationship. Id. at *5 (quoting TrauMed of America, Inc., 71 S.W.3d at 701).
The court found HCR’s claim to be lacking as HCR failed to
identify the parties that were impacted by Knight after she became the
executrix. The court found there was no genuine issue of material fact,
and the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment. This ruling
indicates that the summary judgment thresholds will apply to all claims.

THE NUANCES OF TRADEMARK PROTECTION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that if
the name of an event qualifies as an inherently distinctive mark, it
warrants trademark protection under the Lanham Trademark Act.
Ausable River Trading Post v. Dovetail Sols. Inc., 902 F.3d 567 (6th Cir.
2018).
Katelyn Murdock
In Ausable River Trading Post v. Dovetail Sols. Inc., the Sixth Circuit
addressed when a mark is protected as a trademark. Namely, the court
looked at two categories of inherently distinctive marks that entitle such a
mark to trademark protection under the Lanham Trademark Act.
For sixty years, the Tawas Area Chamber of Commerce (the
“Chamber”) has hosted an event called the “Perchville Festival” in Tawas,
Michigan. The festival’s founders coined the name “Perchville” in 1949
to identify the event. Then in 2002, the Chamber registered the name as a
trademark. Aside from an accidental lapse in the trademark’s registration
in 2013 that the Chamber quickly remedied, Chamber has maintained the
registered trademark since its initial registration.
In October 2015, the Ausable River Trading Post (the “Trading
Post”) sought to print the “Perchville” name on shirts to sell but
discovered that they would have to pay the Chamber a licensing fee to do
so. However, without paying the fee or asking for the Chamber’s
permission to use the “Perchville” mark, the Trading Post made the shirts
bearing the mark. The Chamber subsequently sought an injunction from
a Michigan state court against a Trading Post employee, which prompted
the Trading Post to file a separate action in state court. In this action, the
Trading Post sought a declaratory judgement against the Chamber and its
management company, Dovetail Solutions, to “invalidat[e] the Perchville
mark under Federal Law.” Ausable, 902 F.3d at 569. The suit was then
moved to federal court.
The case first went to the district court, which granted a summary
judgement in favor of the Chamber, but at the Trading Post’s appeal, the
Sixth Circuit Court reversed the district court’s summary judgement
because the Chamber’s injunction did not apply to the Trading Post itself
but to the employee against whom it was filed. When the case went back
to the district court, the court held that “Perchville” is an inherently
distinctive mark that falls under the protection of the Lanham Act, once
again ruling in the Chamber’s favor. However, the Trading Post appealed
again to the Sixth Circuit and made four arguments regarding why
“Perchville” should not be entitled to trademark protection.
Before addressing these arguments, the Sixth Circuit looked at the
definition of a trademark under the Lanham Act and used case precedent
to determine whether “Perchville” is a trademark protected under the Act.
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The court stated that the “Lanham Act protects trademarks, defined as
‘any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof’ that a
person uses ‘to identify and distinguish his or her goods.’” Ausable, 902
F.3d at 569 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127). The court then expanded on the
idea of what it means to distinguish one’s goods. First, the court identified
two types of marks protected by the Lanham Act but focused on
inherently distinctive marks. The court then defined three categories of
inherently distinctive marks by providing explanations and examples of
each, focusing on fanciful marks and suggestive marks. According to the
Sixth Circuit, a fanciful mark is a word that someone invents, such as
“Kodak” film, and a suggestive mark is a “word[] or phrase[] that require[s]
‘imagination and perception to determine the nature of the goods,’” such
as “Old Spice,” which prompts the consumer to imagine what old spices
smell like. Ausable, 902 F.3d at 570 (quoting Innovation Ventures, LLC v.
N.V.E., Inc., 694 F.3d 723, 730 (6th Cir. 2012)). After defining these
terms, the court then addressed case precedent in the specific context of
trademarks and their relationship to places and events, noting generally
that it is difficult to trademark events or goods named after or described
by geographic locations.
In its analysis of this case, the Sixth Circuit first dismissed any
argument that the name “Perchville” references any geographic location,
reasoning that “Perchville” is not a real place but merely the name of one
festival held in Tawas, Michigan. As a result, “Perchville” is not subject
to the difficulties involved in enforcing a trademark for a mark that
references a geographic location. The court then moved on to determining
whether “Perchville” is an inherently distinctive mark. First, the court
analyzed “Perchville” as a fanciful mark, noting that the word was made
up to describe the festival in Tawas and has no meaning outside of its
reference to the event. The court, however, conceded that the component
parts of the name “Perchville” are not made up and do have meanings
independent of the festival. The court noted that this does not disqualify
“Perchville” from falling under the category of a fanciful mark but instead
enables it to qualify also as a suggestive mark.
A suggestive mark requires “imagination and perception,” and the court
explained that “Perchville’s” component parts––“perch,” meaning a
species of fish, and the suffix “-ville” referencing a “fictitious place[] or
concept[] denoting a particular quality”––inspire those who hear them
together to imagine what they could mean as a whole. Ausable, 902 F.3d
at 571 (quoting The New Fowler’s Modern English Usage 826 (R.W.
Burchfield ed., 3d rev. ed. 1998)). Thus, the Sixth Circuit held that
“Perchville” qualifies as both a fanciful and suggestive mark, making it
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inherently distinctive and therefore entitling it to trademark protection
under the Lanham Act.
Following this analysis, the court then specifically addressed the
four arguments presented by the Trading Post. First, the Trading Post
argued that the name “Perchville” was a generic term because “the public
does not associate the name with the Chamber of Commerce but instead
with the festival itself.” Id. The court responded by addressing the
Lanham Act’s amendment from 1984, which made it so that a mark does
not become generic just because it “is used as a name of or to identify a
unique product or service.” Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3)). Therefore,
the fact that “Perchville” is the name of a unique event does not take away
its status as a distinctive mark. The court also highlighted Congress’s
instruction for courts to “ignore whether consumers can identify the
parent company that owns a mark or produces a product.” Id. (citing 15
U.S.C. § 1127). Thus, the court reasoned that it did not matter whether
residents of Tawas knew the festival merely by its name or by its
association with the Chamber. The mark could still be inherently
distinctive even when its owner was not generally known.
In its second argument, the Trading Post claimed that “Perchville”
is a common term used by residents of Tawas; therefore, it is as generic as
words like “‘trampoline’ or ‘thermos.’” Id. The court quickly dismissed
this argument because a thermos “refers to a general class of containers”
that has more than one manufacturer, whereas “Perchville” “refers to a
single event…that has one source.” Id. Therefore, the Trading Post’s
comparison was invalid and did not establish “Perchville” as a generic
term.
The Trading Post’s third argument addressed the fact that
“Perchville” contains two, component words that have independent
meanings; therefore, it cannot be a fanciful mark. The court reiterated its
earlier explanation of suggestive marks, stating that this claim concedes
that the term “Perchville” is a mark that inspires imagination and is thus
entitled to trademark protection as a suggestive mark.
Finally, the Trading Post argued that the “Chamber abandoned the
trademark or that laches prevent[ed] the Chamber from enforcing the
mark.” Id. The court addressed both these issues separately. First, the
court defined the abandonment of a trademark as the “discontinued” use
of the mark “with intent not to resume such use.” Id. at 572 (quoting 15
U.S.C. § 1127). The court brought up the fact that the Chamber
demonstrated its intention to keep their trademark in two ways: (1) when
trademark expired in 2013, the Chamber quickly remedied the lapse and
reapplied; and (2) the Chamber enforced a fee to use the trademark. As a
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result of the Chamber’s intentional interaction with the trademark itself,
the court determined that the Chamber did not abandon it. Second, the
court addressed the rule of laches briefly, stating that it applies “only when
a trademark owner sleeps on his rights to the detriment of another.”
Ausable, 902 F.3d at 572. The court pointed out, however, that laches do
not apply here because the Chamber sought to enforce its trademark as
soon as it learned the Trading Post planned to evade the licensing fee
required to use the “Perchville” mark. The Chamber did not delay,
therefore, the Trading Post’s fourth argument was also insufficient.
Thus, the Sixth Circuit held that because “Perchville” is both a
fanciful and suggestive mark, it qualifies as an inherently distinctive mark
that warrants trademark protection. Further, the court held that there was
no instance of trademark abandonment nor were there laches that would
make the Chamber’s trademark unenforceable.
This decision provides an example of how to use existing caselaw
to determine whether an event’s name can qualify for trademark
protection under the Lanham Act. It demonstrates how even though a
name might not fit in one category of an inherently distinctive mark, it
may easily slip into one or two other categories, as the court demonstrated
by showing how “Perchville” could qualify as both a fanciful and
suggestive mark. This opinion does, however, indicate that events named
after geographical locations are much more complex than the issues dealt
with here. The court emphasized that name “Perchville” itself has nothing
to do with a geographic location, though the event is known only to a
specific town. If the name did have something to do with the town’s
name, it would be much harder for the Chamber to be able to enforce a
trademark over it. Thus, in addition to demonstrating how to use the
existing tests surrounding inherently distinctive remarks, this opinion
highlights the difficulty of enforcing trademarks pertaining to geographic
locations, and transactional lawyers should be conscious of this as they
advise clients in trademark development.

GOOD FAITH, FAIR DEALING, AND MATERIAL
BREACH
The Court of Appeals for Tennessee at Jackson held that a lessor
retains the right to terminate a lease agreement when the lessee
materially breaches the agreement and fails to act according to good
faith and fair dealing standards. Knight v. Horse Creek Rock Inc., No.
W2018-01294-COA-R3-CV, 2019 Tenn. Ct. App. LEXIS 151, 2019 WL
1373720 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2019).
Naudia O’Steen
In Knight v. Horse Creek Rock Inc., the Tennessee Court of Appeals
addressed whether the Chancery Court at Jackson properly granted
summary judgement for the lessor regarding a breach of contract claim
and an intentional interference with a business relationship counterclaim
in relation to a lease agreement. Upon review, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgement of the Chancery Court for both appeals.
In April of 2012, Elton M. Johnson (“Mr. Johnson”) entered into
a lease agreement with Horse Creek Rock, Inc. (“HCR”) which allowed
HCR to mine limestone from Mr. Johnson’s property. One of the terms
of the lease stated that every month HCR was to provide Mr. Johnson
with copies of the weight tickets. These weight tickets would be used to
determine the royalties Mr. Johnson received from HCR; however, the
weight tickets were never provided to Mr. Johnson by HCR, and instead,
HCR gave him monthly ticket summaries. Mr. Johnson passed on
December 11, 2014, and Susan Knight (“Ms. Knight”) was appointed
executrix of his estate. Ms. Knight immediately began requesting monthly
weight tickets from HCR, which HCR never produced. On January 10,
2015, Ms. Knight requested that HCR provide her with an accounting in
writing. HCR failed to deliver any weight tickets to Ms. Knight.
Accordingly, Ms. Knight filed suit on April 2, 2015, against HCR for an
accounting of the business on the estate. Ms. Knight delivered a formal
notice on May 6, 2015, that notified HCR that they were in breach of the
lease agreement due to failure to provide weight tickets. Per the contract,
HCR had thirty days to cure the breach or Ms. Knight would have the
option to terminate the agreement. HCR never delivered the weight tickets
to Ms. Knight. On January 14, 2016, Ms. Knight exercised the estate’s
right to terminate the lease agreement with HCR for material breach of
the lease agreement.
Ms. Knight amended the complaint on March 1, 2016, to include
a breach of contract claim and a request for declaratory judgement stating
she had properly terminated the lease agreement. HCR, in its reply,
asserted a counterclaim against Ms. Knight for intentional interference
with a business relationship, inducement to breach of contract, slander,
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and intentional interference with a contract. Then, the estate filed for
summary judgement on its declaratory judgment claim. After a hearing,
the trial court declared that the lease agreement had been properly
terminated. Subsequently, the trial court dismissed the counterclaims of
inducement for breach of contract, intentional interference with a
contract, and slander on March 1, 2018. Following the trial court’s
dismissal of these claims, Ms. Knight filed for a temporary injunction and
restraining order against HCR to stop the limestone mining, which was
ultimately granted, and HCR filed a request to amend the summary
judgement, which was denied. Later, the trial court amended the order for
the summary judgement of the declaratory judgement stating that it was a
final order on May 1, 2018.
Consequently, a notice of appeal regarding the final order was filed by
HCR on June 4, 2018. On June 8, 2018, the trial court also granted Ms.
Knight’s motion for summary judgment on HCR’s intentional
interference with a business relationship counterclaim. Accordingly, HCR
filed a second appeal. The Court of Appeals then found that the verdict
regarding the declaratory judgement was not final. Ms. Knight voluntarily
dismissed the remaining claims of the estate for accounting of the business
and breach of contract, and the trial court entered the voluntary dismissal
on October 5, 2018. The two appeals were then consolidated into a single
appeal with two main issues: (i) the breach of contract claim by Ms. Knight
and (ii) the intentional interference with a business relationship
counterclaim by HCR.
On review, the Court of Appeals ultimately agreed with the trial
court’s awarding of summary judgment in favor of the estate for both
claims, because (1) the failure of HCR to provide weight tickets upon the
request of Ms. Knight did amount to a material breach of the agreement;
(2) the waiver defense asserted by HCR was properly rejected due to
HCR’s failure to meet the burden of proof, and (3) Ms. Knight did not
intentionally interfere with the business relationship of HCR. The court
stated that the standard of review for summary judgement is a “de novo”
review. Therefore, the court determines, for itself, whether any genuine
issues of material fact exist; and if the court finds no issues exist, the trial
court’s decision to award summary judgment is affirmed.
First, The Court of Appeals examined the argument that the
failure to provide weight tickets did not amount to a material breach of
the lease agreement. HCR argued that although they may have technically
breached the lease by failing to provide the weight tickets, the failure itself
was so minor that it did not constitute a material breach of the lease

2022]

GOOD FAITH, FAIR DEALING, AND MATERIAL BREACH

171

agreement. The court stated that a “contractual breach must be material
in order to justify relieving the non-breaching party of its obligations under
the contracts.” While the court listed five factors1 that may be used to
decide if a breach is material, the court identified factors (a), (b), and (e) as
the most relevant for the issue at hand. Each factor was then used to
justify the court’s finding: the failure to provide the weight tickets resulted
in the estate not receiving the full “benefit of the bargain that was
reasonably expected”; the estate could not be “adequately compensated”
for the loss of the weight tickets because there was no “adequate
substitute” available; and HCR’s unwillingness to provide the weight
tickets showed their unwillingness to comport “with standards of good
faith and fair dealing.” Since HCR failed to provide weight tickets after
multiple requests, which fell below the standard of good faith practice, and
the estate had no adequate substitute for the weight tickets as they were
the sole source for calculating royalties, the Court of Appeals agreed with
the trial court’s finding that there was a material breach of the contract by
HCR.
Next, the Court of Appeals looked at HCR’s defense that the
estate had waived the right to request the weight tickets, because no tickets
had been requested for the first two years of the lease. To prevail on the
defense of express waiver of a condition, the claiming party must show by
a preponderance of the evidence that the other party manifested “an intent
and purpose” to waive that right. The evidence HCR produced for their
defense failed to meet the required burden of proof: an amended
complaint that stated that the “weight tickets were available upon request”
and an affidavit from their own employee that again stated that the tickets
were always available upon request. The court held that HCR failed to
show that Mr. Johnson, the estate of Johnson, or Ms. Knight ever
1 “Tennessee cases have adopted the following factors in considering whether a breach
is material: ‘(a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit
which he reasonably expected; (b) the extent to which the injured party can be
adequately compensated for the part of that benefit of which he will be deprived; (c)
the extent to which the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will suffer
forfeiture; (d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will
cure his failure, taking account of all the circumstances including any reasonable
assurances; (e) the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform or to
offer to perform comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing.’” (quoting
Forrest Constr. Co. v. Laughlin, 337 S.W.3d 211, 225–26 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009)).
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manifested an intent to waive the condition of the weight tickets.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals affirmed the granting of summary
judgment in favor of the estate for the breach of contract claim.
Finally, the Court of Appeals reviewed whether the trial court had
properly granted summary judgement to Ms. Knight on the counterclaim
by HCR which stated Ms. Knight had intentionally interfered with a
business relationship. The court stated five elements that must be proven
by the party claiming intentional interference to win. The court did not
review if these factors were proved individually, but instead discussed
HCR’s failure to comply with Tenn. R. Civ. Pro. 56.03 and 56.06. Overall,
HCR failed to “set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for
trial” because HCR filed a late response that failed to point out how the
facts offered in the estate’s motion were actually disputed in the record.
Due to this failure by HCR, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court
correctly granted Ms. Knight summary judgement on the intentional
interference claim because she (1) complied with the court’s deadlines and
Tenn. R. Civ. Pro. 56.03 and 56.06; and (2) demonstrated in her motion
that there was no issue of material fact that was left to be disputed at trial.
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court on both issues finding that the failure to provide the weight tickets
amounted to a material breach of the contract due to the significant
purpose the tickets played in accounting, and HCR failed to meet the
burden of proof required to establish that Ms. Knight intentionally
interfered with a business relationship due to HCR’s noncompliance with
Tenn. R. Civ. Pro. 56.03. Therefore, the granting of summary judgment
by the trial court on both issues in favor of Ms. Knight was affirmed as
there was no genuine dispute of material fact.
For practicing attorneys, this case serves as a reminder that a case
is easily won by being an attentive attorney. If HCR had adequately met
the burden of proof standard for the waiver defense and complied with
the court’s deadlines and the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, there is
a chance that HCR could have been won this case at trial and on appeal.
At the end of the day, this case serves as a fruitful reminder that an
attorney, who is attentive to detail, will always outperform an opponent
who overlooks essential steps in the adjudication process.

The Protection of Creativity in Trademark Law
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that
the Lanham Trade-Mark Act protects distinctive marks of a fanciful
and unique nature. Additionally, occasional leasing of a trademark
does not constitute abandonment merely because a third party has
access to the protected name. Ausable River Trading Post, LLC. v. Dovetail
Solutions, Inc. & Tawas Area Chamber of Commerce, 902 F.3d 567 (6th Cir.
2018).
Jonathan Williams
In Ausable River Trading Post, LLC. v. Dovetail Solutions, Inc., the Sixth
Circuit addressed whether invalidating a registered trademark is justifiable
based on its commonplace name, occasional licensing, and alleged
abandonment. This court has previously held that a trademark, after
registration, is valid until a party can overcome the burden of proof when
challenging it. According to Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros. Inc.,
descriptive marks become distinctive when associated with a particular
good over time.1 Additionally, fanciful words of no independent meaning
are inherently protected by trademark law. However, despite the nature of
the words, a trademark may be undermined by its abandonment and lack
of enforcement. Upon review, the Sixth Circuit held that this trademark
was indeed fanciful, and the plaintiffs did not satisfy the burden of proof
to render the trademark abandoned despite the occasional licensing to
third parties.
For the past 60 years, Tawas, Michigan, has owned and operated
the “Perchville” festival consisting of a fishing tournament and a polar
bear swim. From early on, the Tawas Area Chamber of Commerce (the
“Chamber), through their third-party management company, “Dovetail
Solutions,” has maintained a trademark for the name of this festival and
enjoyed its protection and lease benefits from licensing it to third parties.
In practice, the Chamber imposed a $750 fee for any party seeking to use
the name. Despite its protected name, the Ausable River Trading Post (the
“Trading Post”) manufactured Perchville-branded tee shirts without
Chamber’s permission or payment. When the Chamber learned of the
unlicensed merchandise, they secured a state court injunction against the
Trading Post to halt their production of the unlicensed merchandise. In
response, the Trading Post filed a separate action in state court to
invalidate the trademark.
The Chamber later removed this case to federal court, which
upheld the previous injunction against the Trading Post’s employee and
concluded that it prevented their employer from relitigating the issue.
1

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 210 (2000).
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After appealing the dispute, the Sixth Circuit held that the injunction did
not apply to the employer, and the case was remanded to the district court
to determine the validity of the trademark. Here, the court granted the
Chamber summary judgment holding that the name “Perchville” was
distinctive and would continue to receive trademark protection. The
district court refused to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of the
remaining state law claims and remanded them to state court. The Trading
Post appealed.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit determined if the Lanham Act should
protect the validity of the trademark. If a term was to be considered
trademark, it would have to fall within the interpretation of the Lanham
Act to receive protection. This Act defines the term trademark as “any
word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof” that a person
uses “to identify and distinguish his or her goods . . . from those
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods,
even if that source is unknown.”2 Subsequent determinations of what falls
within this Act are parsed out and defined through case law. As it applies
here, the court had to make three determinations to satisfy applicable
precedent: (1) Whether the trademark was inherently descriptive, (2)
which category it fell into, and (3) whether the defendant abandoned the
trademark.
For a mark to be protected, it must in turn be considered
distinctive. Distinctive trademarks are comprised of two categories: “(1)
Inherently distinctive marks; and (2) descriptive marks that become
distinctive when they become associated with a particular good over
time.”3 As it applies here, inherently distinctive trademarks also consist of
three classes: “(1) arbitrary, (2) fanciful, and (3) suggestive.”4 The text
describes arbitrary marks as having a real, widely understood meaning not
unique to the product. This would include terms such as Base Ball, Tennis
Shoe, or, as the case describes, “Apple Computers.” Alone, these words
can be tied to other meanings and are generically understood, but together
they make a unique connection to the trademark. Shoes encompass several
types, but tennis shoes are specific. Further, apples and computers have
nothing to do with one another, and a base has nothing to do with a ball
until you put the two words together.
On the other hand, suggestive trademarks are of a different ilk.
These words require “imagination and perception to determine the nature
of the goods.” These marks are more frequently protected as they are
15 U.S.C.A. § 1127.
Id.
4 Id.
2
3
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more unique than arbitrary marks. Phrases such as Sierra Mist would
require one to imagine the smell and taste of a beverage on a misty
morning in the sierra. While case law hyperbolizes the level of imagination
required to tie these terms to products, they are due protection in their
own right as they are typically unique to the good and are not generic in
nature.
Finally, the last class and arguably the most protected would
include fanciful marks. In short, these are “made up” words. Coca-Cola,
Mitsubishi, and Yeti have no relevant meaning to the goods they represent.
These made-up words are not inherently without meaning but often have
nothing to do with the product to which they are attached. However, there
is no dispute that their names are due protection as their creation was
solely to identify their products in connection to a new term.
As they apply here, the court can analyze these concepts in
connection with places and events such as a festival. An exception to the
above classification is that geographic terms are inherently difficult to
trademark as they are indistinctive and often widely known to the public.
These terms would include city names, counties, and states, which of
course, would go unprotected. However, other words can be tied to
geographical phrases to offer a secondary meaning as an exception to this
exception. Mt. Fiji is certainly an identifiable landmass however FIJI water
is unique and distinctive to a company and product.
With this analysis, the court determined that was “Perchville”
unique to the festival and classified it as fanciful. The plaintiff argued that
the term “Perchville” should be split into two parts, “perch,” a type of
fish, and “ville,” a city or location. Alone these words are not unique and
allude to a fishing competition that the Trading Post considered to be nondistinct and generic. The Sixth Circuit disagreed. The court pointed out
that this phrase was coined in 1949 and has since had no connection, other
than the event, to Tawas, Michigan, let alone any other event or place that
the plaintiff was able to identify. The court held that this name bore the
resemblance of a fanciful mark, one created for the sole reason of
identifying this activity. Additionally, the plaintiff argued that the
trademark has since been abandoned.
It was also noted that the term “Perchville” is not a nonsense
word. As pointed out by the Trading Post, it alludes to a place consisting
of fish or fisherman. This would also qualify it as a suggestive mark. One
could gather from the name that this place involving fish may be an event,
a fishing location, or perhaps a city. Despite this, the pondering of
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meaning would require “imagination and perception” that the Lanham act
would be geared at protecting.
As a secondary argument, the Trading Post argued that the
trademark has since been abandoned and is no longer protected. To prove
that a mark has been abandoned, one must overcome the burden of
proving that the Chamber discontinued the use of their trademark and/or
the mark has become a generic name for goods or services.
The plaintiff raised the issue that the Chamber allowed others to
use the trademark. Specifically, the Chamber often allowed others to use
the name “Perchville” to produce products and services for a fee. This
argument failed as the court differentiated this from a simple failure to
prevent its use by third parties. They cited a previous holding stating that
trademarks can be maintained through controlled licensing and that mere
allowance of this use does not amount to abandonment.
The Sixth Circuit’s ruling creates a well-reasoned stance on the
fundamentals of trademark law. Attorneys should review the analysis
provided in this case when challenging or being challenged by the validity
of a trademark. At the bare minimum, one should ponder the distinct
nature of a trademark and ask whether the court would consider it
arbitrary, suggestive, or fanciful. It was evident that the trial court, in this
case, struggled with separating the state law claims from the trademark
issue and which claims were precluded. What the court did not struggle
with was the interpretation of the trademark precedent established above.
Should one fail to successfully differentiate from the analysis of distinctive
marks, attorneys should also be wary of whether a trademark has been
abandoned in its use. The protected mark is capable of being licensed to
third parties, which weighs against the argument that it has since been
abandoned.

